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Abstract 
The paper presents both the New Consensus and Keynesian equilibrium within the usual four 
competitive macro-markets structure. It gives theoretical explanations of the pernicious 
effects that the NCM governance, which has been designed for ergodic stationary regimes, 
brings about in Keynesian non-ergodic regimes. It put forward Keynesian principles of 
governance which include monetary, budgetary and fiscal instruments, and suggest new 
directions for the positive and normative analysis of macro-policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Macroeconomic governance includes two levels of decisive determinants which take part in 
the designing of macroeconomic policies. The institutional frame fixes the constitutional 
obligations and objectives of monetary and budgetary-fiscal policies, like price stability, high 
levels of employment and growth, limited deficits… With respect of the institutional frame, 
the second level concerns general principles for the conduct of macro-policies: 
macroeconomic targets (unemployment, budget balance, inflation…), automatic rules or 
discretion, flexibility of the policy mix around the constitutional objectives… 
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Macroeconomic governance and policy design depend, in a crucial way, on the vision 
regarding to the long run properties of the economic system. For example, stochastic 
stationary regimes, say disturbed economic systems with constant rate of growth, may possess 
strong regulatory forces which anchor the system on a predetermined trend1, and make 
rational expectations reliable. In such regimes, which inspired the New Consensus 
Macroeconomics (NCM), the economic governance only consists in stabilizing around the 
trend. On the other hand, there is no predictable trend in non-ergodic regimes, with the result 
that people do not have full confidence in their expectations, whether they make use of 
probabilities or not, and whatever kind of probabilities they make use of. That is the starting 
point of the liquidity preference theory, and of The General Theory. In these regimes, 
economic policy takes part in the trajectory of the economic system. 
The weakening of Keynesian ideas among mainstream economists stems from a misplaced 
analysis of the relevance of demand policies in ergodic stationary regimes. Since automatic 
adjustment towards a 'natural trend' is postulated (owing to the beneficial 'competitive forces') 
in such regimes, monetary and fiscal policies may at best have some temporary effect, as New 
Keynesianism pointed out in the presence of nominal rigidities. Hence, the sole valid goal that 
monetary policy may target concerns inflation control so as to avoid excessive demand 
policies that could degenerate into public debt, seigniorage and finally, inflationary penalties 
owed to the inconsistency of discretionary policies. Moreover, budgetary and fiscal policy 
may involve temporary or permanent effects on relative prices and real variables because of 
distortions on the resources allocation process, which put the economic efficiency in 
opposition to the fiscal redistributive laws on which the social order is based. 
 
                                               
1
 This point supposes that competitive mechanisms anchor the system in a predetermined trajectory. It has been 
identified as the dynamic stability of a stochastic process (ergodicity). See Vercelli (1991: 40, 154) and 
Davidson (2002: 39, 69). 
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But the problem Keynes pointed out is not about aggregate demand management in 
ergodic regimes, with the result that most of the critics addressed to Keynesian economics 
lack of consistency. The paper aims to theorize the inadequacy of the New Consensus 
Macroeconomics governance in non-ergodic regimes and to propose Keynesian principles of 
governance including monetary, fiscal and budgetary instruments. Section 2 compares the two 
alternative modelling principles within the usual four competitive macro-markets structure 
and discusses on markets interactions, adjustment processes and equilibrium properties. 
Section 3 deals with macro governance and economic policy issues. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The four competitive macro-markets structure 
This section first discusses the main implications of non-ergodicity with respect to the 
macroeconomic adjustment process; then we formalize and compare the New Consensus and 
Keynesian short run equilibrium behaviour within the usual four competitive macro-markets 
structure. 
 
2.1. Uncertainty, confidence and macroeconomic adjustment 
Because they disagree about the long run properties, the New Consensus and Keynesian 
Macroeconomics have distinct conceptions of the macro functioning of competitive markets. 
The former believe in the existence of natural laws, which reduce uncertainty to some short 
run phenomenon that does not matter in the long run (risk). The latter considers that the real 
world evolves within a stronger kind of uncertainty, which is inconsistent with the idea that 
there is any predetermined system trajectory. In such regimes, people may of course make 
expectations, including rational expectations, but the meaning and usefulness of such forward 
looking information is quite different form the one usually given to it. Keynesian rationality 
of expectations could admit that people make the best use of all the available information, not 
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that the long run trajectory is foreseeable. Whatever the kind of probabilistic tools people 
might make use of, they can not rationally consider their expectations as a sufficient basis for 
decision making as regards the long run. That is the reason why Keynes thought that decisions 
actually depend on the degree of confidence people have in the better previsions they can do 
(The General Theory, ch. 12). That is the very reason why the liquidity preference makes 
sense, with so heavy consequences for the macroeconomic adjustment process. 
In ergodic competitive regimes, aggregate demand adjusts to the supply of goods, in the 
same time that investment adjusts to the supply of saving, because nothing hinders the 
adjustment of real wages and interest rate. If aggregate demand (and prices) decreases, the 
need for transaction-money falls, and the rate of interest decreases, rising the demand and the 
price of goods and moving the real wages towards their full employment level2. But, in 
Keynesian contexts, the magnitude of the decrease in interest rate (the so-called 'Keynes 
effect') and of any positive real balance effect (people do not want to hold idle cash balances 
and therefore increase the demand for goods) depends on speculative decisions concerning the 
demand for money, with the result that income and employment finally depend on the degree 
of confidence of the moment and its impact on the demand for money3. Since nominal wages 
decrease does not ensure positive effects on effective demand (and price index) either4, there 
is no endogenous correction of unemployment, and, furthermore, Keynesian unemployment 
has to be thought as a situation where both real wages and interest rates meet a kind of 
threshold5. 
 
                                               
2
 Theoretically, it is possible that flexible nominal wages reach this solution without any variation in the rate of 
interest (but some obstacles may jeopardize it; see The General Theory, Ch. 19): through positive effects on the 
marginal efficiency of capital and effective demand, wage flexibility may produce inflation, reduce real wage 
and rise production. If on the other hand nominal wages are sticky, the role of interest rate becomes crucial. 
3
 This is why Keynes thought about his general theory as a theory of shifting equilibrium (The General Theory, 
Ch. 21, Section I, third paragraph). 
4
 See the footnote n° 2. 
5
 Otherwise, wages would decrease continuously because of unemployment pressure. See Tobin (1975) and 
Palley (2005) about this kind of instability. 
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2.2. Markets interactions and general equilibrium 
Within the usual four macro-markets framework, general equilibrium supposes a set of 
conditions which expresses suppliers and demanders plans. Because of the Walras law, three 
markets only must be explicit. Moreover, since the money supply is assumed to be exogenous 
for the moment, the general equilibrium conditions reduce to five: the supply and demand for 
labour conditions, the supply and demand for goods conditions, and the market for money 
clearing condition (see Table 1)6.  
 
Table 1: NCM general equilibrium conditions (deviations from the 'natural trend') 
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(2) Supply: marginal disutility of labour 
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(4) Aggregate demand (see appendix n°2) 
 
 
Market  
for money 
(p) 
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(5) Market clearing condition (exogenous 
supply*); by setting the quantity of money, the 
central bank controls p and may (temporarily) 
impact the demand for labour and the supply of 
goods through inflation surprises: app −  
 
Market for 
bonds 
 
Implicit 
 
 
Walras law 
* The case for endogenous money is discussed below. 
n is the relative variation in employment 
w is the nominal wage relative variation 
pa is the expected increase in prices till the next period 
                                               
6
 The reader will find more details on the methodological aspects of our modelling in Asensio (2005). 
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d is an exogenous term 
y is the relative variation in volume of output 
c represents exogenous technological factors 
g is the relative variation in the government demand for goods 
tˆ  is the variation in the tax rate 
a is the relative variation in the exogenous part of aggregate private demand 
iˆ  is the variation in the rate of interest 
m is the relative variation in the quantity of money 
We focus on the short run behaviour of the system, in the sense that the productive 
physical stock of capital is assumed to be constant during the period. Hence, variables are 
expressed in terms of relative variations from their initial value, excepting the rate of interest 
and the tax rate, which are expressed as variations.  All parameters are positive. 
Furthermore, we suppose that labour contracts have been negotiated, at the starting point of 
the period, on the basis of the expected rate of inflation for the current period (pa). Hence, if 
pa=p (which is assumed to be true in the 'long run', as a result of rational expectations in 
ergodic stationary regimes), inflationary shocks have no effect on employment (equation 1) 
and production  (equation 3), but in case of inflationary surprise (ppa), demand shocks 
influence the level of employment through the prediction error (p-pa). 
The model lends itself to an analysis in terms of aggregate supply and aggregate demand. 
Equations (4) and (5), which are similar to the IS-LM conditions, give the demand equation 
y(p), which may be written as p(y): 
( ) ( )
m
tagyp +−+++−=
σ
ηγϕηλση ˆ
 
Equations (1), (2), and (3) give the supply equation: 
( )
c
tdppy
a
+
+
−+−
=
ρθ
αρξααρ
1
ˆ
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Resolution yields y and p, which permits to solve for n by (3), then w by (2), and finally iˆ  by 
(5). Remember that output variations do not really depend on current price index variations, 
but on the current price index error of prediction, as clearly shows the supply equation. 
In recent versions of the NCM (see Romer, 2000), monetary policy consists in controlling 
the rate of interest rather than the quantity of money, which has to be considered as an 
endogenous variable7. In this case, output (y) is determined by the sole aggregate demand 
components (equation 4). Then we can get n by (3), w by (2), p by (1) and finally m by the 
function LM (equation 5), which actually is not required for determining real magnitudes8. It 
is however important to note that this demand led behaviour only may hold temporarily. 
Indeed, it can be shown that if authorities set the rate of interest so as to avoid any price index 
error of prediction (that is p=pa), then the results are the same as in the case of exogenous 
money supply where m is set so as to avoid errors of prediction (the interest rate remains in 
this case at the 'natural' level). Since there can be no systematic prediction errors, but only 
stochastic ones, it is obvious from Table 1 that in the long run a) employment is exclusively 
determined in the market for labour, b) output and interest rate are determined in the market 
for goods, conditionally to the market for labour results, and c) money is necessary exogenous 
and governs the price index behaviour, in accordance with the pure Classical features. 
Let now consider a context of Keynesian unemployment in which the rate of interest is 
exogenously determined by the monetary authorities (which does not control it perfectly 
however, especially if reductions are concerned; see below), and real wages have met an 
exogenous threshold ( w ) owing to workers resistance. The current wage may deviate from 
this threshold when certain events occur, such as a change in unemployment rate or 
exogenous disturbances, like in equation 2k of Table 2 (where nf is the total labour force). 
                                               
7
 As Palley (2006) stated, this assessment of endogenous money substantially differs from the post-Keynesian 
one. 
8
 Notice that employment is determined by conditions which involve the market for goods, whereas prices are 
determined by conditions involving the labour market. 
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Table 2: Keynesian 'shifting equilibrium' conditions 
(deviations from the previous equilibrium) 
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(4) Effective demand drives aggregate supply 
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(3) Demand: short run production function 
(diminishing marginal product: <1)  
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(2k) Rationed supply ('2d postulate' rejected). 
Variable wage threshold 
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(5k) Market clearing condition (endogenous 
money supply); the demand for money is 
unstable, hence the CB imperfectly controls î. 
 
Market for 
bonds 
 
Implicit 
 
 
Walras law 
 
 
Another Keynesian fundamental topic is the liquidity preference, which can explain 
unforeseeable shifts in the demand for money owing to the impact of uncertainty on the 'state 
of confidence' (The General Theory, Ch. 12). This specificity will be formally underlined 
through considering ηk as an exogenous variable which is subject to the volatility of 
expectations9. It has heavy implications on monetary policy because it makes the central bank 
control of long term interest rates questionable. When the monetary base is increased through 
lowering the short term rates, lower long term bank rates in principle boost the demand for 
credit, provided the liquidity preference do not shift too much. But an increasing liquidity 
preference may conversely make banks able to sell more credit without having to reduce their 
interest rates, for non-bank loans rates in this case tend to rise in order to compensate the 
                                               
9
 Actually, it is important to bear in mind that most equations of Keynesian models do not pretend to the stability 
that is usually assumed. 
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increasing liquidity preference. Moreover, the liquidity trap may also block the transmission 
process in case of generalized 'bearishness'. For these reasons, the NCM optimal monetary 
rule, which assumes that authorities always may adjust the rate of interest to the natural level, 
is irrelevant in a Keynesian context. 
Interestingly, from a formal point of view, the model of Table 2 looks very much like the 
NCM model with endogenous money, especially when the labour force is constant in the short 
run (nf=0), as it is usually assumed. Here again, output (y) is determined by the sole aggregate 
(effective) demand (equation 4), n by the production function (3), conditionally to the output 
level, w by equation (2), p by equation (1) and finally m through LM. These similarities have 
been a source of confusion for a long time, because they hide fundamental differences as 
concerns the signification and properties of equilibrium. 
In Keynesian regimes, aggregate demand has not only temporary effects; it matters in the 
long run, and deficient effective demand may keep the economy away from full employment. 
In addition, there is volatility of expectations, and therefore volatility of aggregate relations 
and multiple possible equilibria and trajectories, since there is no objective anchor for them 
(no foreseeable trend). It is also this kind of volatility that makes the control of the long term 
interest rate, and therefore the role of monetary policy, questionable. More generally, it calls 
for a quite different macroeconomic governance approach. 
 
3. Macro governance principles and macroeconomic policies 
This section first presents the two competing macro governance approaches. The trials of 
applying NCM principles of governance in non-ergodic contexts then are compared with a 
more pragmatic Keynesian approach of macroeconomic policy. 
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3.1. Divergent governance principles 
3.1.1. Controlling inflation 
As shown in Table 2, equation (1) may be written as a mark-up relation, which reveals the 
distributive factors of inflation. These factors influence the rate of unemployment indirectly, 
through the monetary policy they may induce. Indeed, monetary policy may limit inflation by 
increasing the unemployment pressure on wages via higher rates of interest, so as to preserve 
the confidence of the public regarding the value of money. 
In other circumstances the central bank may prefer to let cost-pushed inflation develop in 
order to preserve the economic activity, which supposes an increase of the money supply. 
Obviously, even when increasing costs are the primary cause, inflation always is a monetary 
phenomenon since it expresses higher monetary prices of goods and services. But whereas 
mainstream economics incriminate irresponsible or lax policies, the Keynesian approach 
points out the dilemma involved by distributive tensions. The former think that reducing 
monetary inflation has no permanent cost in terms of unemployment, whereas it does for the 
latter, as far as persistent tensions induce monetary authorities to maintain high interest rates. 
 
3.1.2. Demand side policies 
Because of the conviction that markets work as efficiently as possible in the long run, 
mainstream economics pleads in favour of little discretionary freedom and strong monetary 
control of inflation, which means avoiding excessive public debt and systematic temptation to 
get 'extra output' by means of inflation surprises. On the demand side, monetary and fiscal 
policies may be employed so as to reduce the output and price index volatilities around their 
long run known trajectory (Table 3). On the supply side, competitive distortions and other real 
rigidities, which explain the gap between the natural level of activity and the full capacity 
level, come under the competence of 'structural' policies. 
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Table 3: NCM governance principles (stabilization = 'natural trend' oriented rules) 
 
 
Monetary policy 
( î, 'Taylor rule')* 
 
 
np β−=  
(6) 0, 'flexibility' of monetary 
policy, i.e. relative weight of 
unemployment deviations compared 
to price deviations (structural 
parameter) 
 
Budgetary-fiscal 
policy  
( g, tˆ )* 
 
 
nb ψ=  
 
 
(7) 0, relative weight of 
unemployment deviations, compared 
to budget balance deviations (b) in 
the government preferences 
(structural parameter) 
*These simple policy rules can be derived by minimization of loss-functions10. 
 
Keynesian economics on the other hand states that the central bank imperfectly controls 
the long term rate of interest, inflation and/or employment, and would redeem budgetary and 
fiscal policy11. Furthermore, since anti-inflation monetary policy may have depressive effects, 
income policy is preferred in case of inflationary distributive conflict. 
As concerns demand policies, in contrast with the automatic policy rules of the NCM, the 
Keynesian approach suggests a pragmatic and progressive approach of discretionary 
macroeconomic policy, where authorities carefully avoid destabilizing expectations and 
private decisions, and therefore the whole aggregate system, because changing behaviours 
finally might make the policy inappropriate (as popularized the Lucas critique)12. 
Discretion in this way means that governments fix intermediate reasonable targets in terms 
of employment, price index and budget balance, according to the confidence they have in the 
chance of success, which depends on the actual context and move with it. In Table 4 below, 
public expenditures are adjusted so as to reach the targeted unemployment rate; taxes are 
                                               
10
 For example, the first order condition that g must verify in order to minimize L=(1/2)(n²+b²) is 
n(n/g)+b(b/g)=0, which is equivalent to b=n provided that =-(n/g)/(b/g). This approach sometimes 
raises difficulties that will not be discussed here. 
11
 For a recent discussion, see Arestis & Sawyer (2003a,b). 
12
 Because he was concerned with non-ergodic regimes, Keynes, who raised the question in The General Theory 
(Ch. 15, see the last third of Section II), found very different implications of the 'critique' (see Vercelli, 1991). 
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adjusted so as to more or less limit the budget balance variation, depending on the relative 
weight of unemployment compared with the budget balance. The central bank adjusts the rate 
of interest (if it can do it) so as to more or less reduce the rate of unemployment, depending 
on the relative weight of unemployment compared to inflation, which depends, among other 
things, on income policy ability to appease distributive tensions. Within this framework, 
economic policy yields a kind of flexible anchorage around full employment (	 may vary). 
 
Table 4: Keynesian governance principles (pragmatism and discretion) 
 
Income 
distribution 
policy 
Temper 
tw ˆ,, α  
appease distributive tensions in order 
to control inflation without having to 
tighten monetary policy 
 
 
 
Monetary policy 
( î, endogenous 
money) 
 
 
 
î  exogenous 
or, when î can be adjusted: 
( )nqp k −= β  
 
 
(9) k0 is set according to the 
context so as to more or less help the 
government to reach its objectives, 
depending on the state of 
inflationary pressures compared with 
unemployment 
 
Budgetary-fiscal 
policy ( g, tˆ ) 
 
qn µ=  
( ) znqb k +−−= ψ  
 
 
(10)   0<	1 and k0 are set  
(11) according to the context 
q is the variation in employment that is initially required for full employment (since n is the 
variation in employment for the current period, q-n measures the level of unemployment at 
the end of the period). 
k represents the 'monetary policy flexibility' (the higher k is, the more the central bank 
concedes inflation in order to fight unemployment). It depends on the context; especially, but 
not only, on the state of the distributive conflict. 
	 is a parameter the government also chooses according to the context (effective demand 
expected sensitivity to the policy instruments, financial constraints, public opinion and other 
political considerations...). 
b is the budget balance variation (relative to GDP); ( ) tgyb ˆ+−≡ ϕ  (see appendix n°4). 
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k represents the 'fiscal policy flexibility' (the higher k is, the less the government adjusts 
taxes, in order to preserve employment, and the higher is the deficit). It depends also on the 
state of financial constraints, on the political acceptability of tax adjustments... 
z represents other factors which may interfere in the short run (deliberate structural deficit due 
to long run public investments, debt management considerations…). 
In this perspective, economic-policy designing hinges as much on the selection of the 
objectives (value of k and 	) as on the adjustment of instruments (value of g and tˆ  which 
solve (9) and (10), given equations (1), (2k), (3) and (4)). 
 
3.2. New governance and Keynesian governance in non-ergodic regimes 
3.2.1. Trials of the New Consensus Governance 
As long as the government can adjust the two instruments (g, tˆ ) freely, there are three 
instruments and three objectives. Solving the system of equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) 
yields: p=n=b=0. Thus, the New Consensus governance gets the ideal outcome in terms of 
prices, output and budget balance stabilization. There is a kind of 'symbiosis' between 
monetary and fiscal policies13. 
The symbiosis however may turn into severe drawbacks when the new governance 
principles of Table 3 are implemented into the non-ergodic system of Table 2. In the presence 
of Keynesian unemployment (q>0), as long as actual unemployment and interest rates are 
interpreted as the 'natural' rates, they serve as macroeconomic policy targets, with the result 
that the policy mix 'symbiotically' anchors the system away from full employment: since they 
targeted n=0, they get q-n=q. The situation then may persist for it seems to be the 
consequence of real wages rigidity (p=0, and w= w  provided nf=0). This line of argument 
suggests that misplaced economic policy may produce a kind of unemployment trap, to which 
                                               
13
 Dixit & Lambertini (2001, 2003) recently extended this result to monetary unions. 
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mainstream uses to refer as hysteresis14: when authorities lack for room for manoeuvre in 
front of a negative shock, for example because of budget balance considerations, the 
symbiosis only works partially, and unemployment increases. Since nothing tends to reduce it 
then, authorities take it as the new natural rate. 
Monetary policy may furthermore be involved in such a depressive scenario in case of 
persistent distributive tensions. As long as inflationary pressures are interpreted as the result 
of a 'natural' lower demand for money, the central bank raises the rate of interest without 
seeing the negative effects it has on employment. Here again, as far as nothing tends to reduce 
the rate of unemployment, authorities take it as the new natural rate. 
 
3.2.2. Keynesian macroeconomic governance 
Let us now consider the type of policy mix involved by the governance principles of Table 4. 
The tax-expenditure combination (g, tˆ ) that is required to reach the employment and budget 
balance targets (9) and (10) (given equations (1), (2k), (3), and (4)) depends on the set of 
exogenous variables and parameters that represent the macroeconomic changing context and 
the confidence of authorities. 
One of these variables is the rate of interest, which expresses monetary influences on the 
policy mix. Notice that the expected monetary policy is probably taken into account by the 
government when it decides about the targets and their relative weight (	,k); for example, if 
the government thinks that the central bank will accommodate, it can adopt a more ambitious 
plan. Hence, the central bank can make it more or less difficult for governments to reach their 
objectives. 
Monetary policy modelling is very sensitive in a Keynesian world since controlling the 
long term rate of interest is uncertain, at least as far as reductions are concerned; but even 
                                               
14
 On hysteresis, ergodic and non-ergodic regimes see the Minisymposium in the Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, 15(3), Spring 1993. 
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when its own positive influence on effective demand is doubtful, it helps indirectly if it gives 
the supplementary money that is needed when fiscal-budgetary policy aim to stimulate the 
effective demand, avoiding by the way a rise of interest rate which otherwise could weaken 
the policy outcome. Of course such a policy mix could produce some rise in the price index, 
but remember that, even in the NCM, this is a necessary condition for economic recovery 
when nominal wages are sticky; relative prices adjustment is quite different from inflation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The paper presents both the New Consensus and Keynesian equilibria within the usual four 
competitive macro-markets structure. It discusses how market interactions differ depending 
on the type of uncertainty, and why the optimum-oriented competitive forces at work in 
ergodic regimes, does not work in the Keynesian representation of the world. It gives 
theoretical explanations of the pernicious effects that the NCM governance brings about in 
non-ergodic regimes, and put forward Keynesian principles of governance which include 
monetary, budgetary and fiscal instruments, and suggest new directions for the positive and 
normative analysis of macro-policies. 
Within a Keynesian perspective, authorities should abandon any reference to the natural 
rate of (un)employment, and other derivative concepts that do not apply to non-ergodic 
systems. If there is no long run predictable trajectory along which money would have only 
nominal influence, the ordinary conduct of monetary and fiscal-budgetary policies can not be 
guided by any systematic 'optimal rule' designed in order to stabilize the economy near from a 
predetermined trend. Uncertainty imposes a gradual and pragmatic approach, closely linked to 
the context. 
Furthermore, authorities should renounce to automatic rules disconnected from the context. 
Discretion is better when there is no predictable trajectory of the economy. From this point of 
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view, authorities should take advantage of the complementarity between the central bank and 
the budgetary-fiscal instruments. That certainly would help the government to fight 
unemployment without denying the financial constraint. It is not necessary a matter of interest 
rate reduction; it may simply hinge on avoiding interest rates increases when the government 
aims to reflate the economy. In addition, the dissuasive impact of the liquidity constraint that 
may result from a reputed non-accommodating monetary policy should not be ignored. Of 
course such a policy mix could produce some rise in the price index, but remember that, even 
in the NCM, this is a necessary condition for economic recovery when nominal wages are 
sticky; relative prices adjustment is quite different from inflation. 
As regard inflation, since central banks can not repress recurrent distributive inflationary 
pressures without having permanent depressive effects on aggregate demand, unless demand 
depresses itself or through budgetary-fiscal policy, authorities should recognize that another 
way for fighting this kind of inflation rests on the continuous pursuit of a consensual income 
distribution. In the paper, the distributive conflict exhibits a dominating influence upon the 
policy mix, because the central bank all the more may help governments since inflation 
pressures are weak. From this point of view, income distribution policy turns out to be of 
primary importance as concerns the costs of inflation control, which corroborates the idea that 
economic efficiency at the macro level, far from being the automatic outcome of free 
competitive forces, should not be considered independently of the political and social context. 
 
Appendix n°1 
It is possible to introduce a fiscal distortion effect by supposing that, in the short run, it work 
through the price of the variable input: replacing the nominal cost of labour (W) by W(1+
 t), 
where 0
<1 measures the (weakened) impact of the tax rate on the labour cost, profit 
maximisation requires Y/N=W(1+
 t)/P. The demand-for-labour relative rate of variation 
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(n) then takes the form of a function of the fiscally-corrected labour cost, which relative 
variation can be approximated by ( twp ˆξ−− ) for small values of tˆ . 
 
Appendix n°2 
Starting from the aggregate demand function ( ) ( ) AGpitYY a ++−−− +1βυ , where Y 
represents the output volume, i the rate of interest, pa+1 the expected inflation rate till the next 
period, t the tax rate (taxes/output),  the propensity to consume, G the governments 
expenditures, A an autonomous component, the market for goods equilibrium requires: 
( ) ( ) AGpitYYY a ++−−−= +1βυ . 
Differentiating around a solution indexed by 0 (with d=0 and dpa+1=0), and dividing by 
Y0, we get: 
0000
0
00 Y
dA
Y
dGdi
Y
dt
Y
dY
t
Y
dY
Y
dY
++−−−=
β
υυυ  
Since t0=T0/Y0, the equality dG/Y0=t0dG/G  holds when the budget is balanced (T0=G0). 
Writing relative deviation rates with small letters (x=dX/X0), except a=dA/Y0, we have: 
( ) agtdi
Y
dtyty ++−−−= 0
0
01
β
υυ  
hence: 
( ) tagiy ˆˆ γϕλσ −++−=  
where ( ) ( ) ( ) 00000 11
1
,
11
1
,
11
,,ˆ,ˆ
Yttt
tdttdii β
υ
σ
υ
λ
υ
υγϕ
−−
=
−−
=
−−
====  
 
Appendix n° 3 
It is not essential to make imperfect competition assumptions in order to obtain a mark-up 
relation. For example, starting with the production function Y=CN, <1, competitive pricing 
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requires the marginal productivity to be equal to the real cost of labour: 
Y/N=W(1+
t)/PP=W(1+
t)/(CN-1)=(WN(1+
t)/Y)/; hence, by differentiation of the 
associated logarithmic expression (for small values of tˆ ), we have tynwp ˆξα +−−+=  , 
where α  is the rate of variation in  (exogenous). Notice that an increasing mark-up on unit 
labour cost expresses in this case a declining wages-output ratio ( 0<α ) and/or increasing 
fiscal taxes ( 0ˆ >= dtt ). 
 
Appendix n°4 
The budget balance (B) is defined as: 
B=tPY-PG 
Differentiating around a solution indexed by 0 yields: 
dB=t0P0dY+P0Y0dt+t0Y0dP-P0dG-G0dP 
and dividing by the initial value of output: 
dB/(P0Y0)=t0dY/Y0+dt+t0dP/P0-dG/Y0-(G0/Y0)(dP/P0) 
Hence, around a situation of balanced budget where t0=G0/Y0 (remember g=dG/G0): 
b=t0(y-g)+dt 
and, with the same notation as in appendix n°1: 
( ) tgyb ˆ+−= ϕ  
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